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Abstract 
Although comanagement is gaining increasing attention as a way to manage fisheries, few studies 
have attempted to understand quantitatively which factors of comanagement are critical for their 
success. This study investigates fishery comanagement regimes adopted by coastal fisheries in 
Japan. Utilizing a wide variety of examples of fishery comanagement nationwide, we search for key 
rules and measures that underlie traditional, cultural, and social aspects of comanagement. The 
study focuses on the rules of the game adopted by comanaging groups called fishery management 
organizations (FMOs). Upon examination of successful fishery comanagement cases, we found two 
distinctive measures: effort coordination and pooling arrangements. Furthermore, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that pooling arrangements are vital supporting measure for effective effort 
coordination, in which case having both of these two measures rather than only either one may be 
the key for successful fishery comanagement. We test this hypothesis with two sets of data. One is 
Japan’s fishery census, which was published by the government and offers a large sample size but 
lacks information on effort coordination. Another is data from a survey designed and conducted by 
the authors to supplement the information on effort coordination and other self-imposed regulations. 
Our results show that (1) merely establishing comanaging groups such as FMOs has limited effect; 
(2) FMOs that establish pooling arrangements earn greater revenue from their fishing efforts, 
particularly when such pooling arrangements are combined with effort-coordination; and (3) 




Coastal fisheries worldwide are faced with the challenge of achieving sustainable use of marine 
resources. Overexploitation of marine resources is a common phenomenon across the globe. In 
fact, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that more than 
three quarters of the world’s main fish stocks are overexploited (United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization 2004b). The traditional command-and-control fishery regulations 
imposed by governments (central or local) to reduce overexploitation have been partially 
effective in protecting the resource stocks but have often failed to improve the fisheries’ 
profitability. In his seminal paper, Gordon (1954) noted that ill-defined property rights over 
fishery resources were at the heart of the problem. Without adequately defined property rights, 
users have no incentive to properly manage the resource because the benefits that would result 
from such management cannot be fully appropriated. The notion and the importance of property 
rights in fishery resource management were thus brought onto the main stage of the discussion. 
  A proposal for individual transferable quotas (ITQs) as a rights-based fishery management 
regime was first put forward by Christy (1973) (as cited in Copes (1986), p. 279). The fact that 
these quotas are transferable makes them a quasi-property right over the fish they are entitled to 
harvest. Since then, ITQ regimes have been implemented in countries that have significant fishing 
resources, including Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand (Arnason 1993; Newell et al. 2005). 
  At the same time, there has been resistance to wholesale adoption of ITQs in many 
countries, for reasons that are both spurious and substantive. ITQs have been subject to a fairly 
constant din of criticism by skeptics. The highly cited Copes (1986) critique offered many 
reasons why we might expect ITQs to fail in practice, including data fouling, black market 2 
off-loading, and high-grading. More recent criticism has focused on “fairness.” The fairness issue 
cuts across various concerns, including the fairness of the actual distributions of rents that are 
generated, the fairness of excluding some bona fide fishermen in the initial allocations, and the 
fairness of granting initial wealth to original participants (e.g., Matulich and Sever 1999). The 
latter two concerns are particularly acute in the context of developing countries, where fisheries 
are the dominant, if not the only, foundation for households’ livelihoods (United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization 2004a). 
  An alternative rights-based fishery management regime is territorial use rights in fisheries, 
or TURFs. TURFs are typically granted to the local fishing community or groups of local 
fishermen. These groups then collectively assume responsibility for fishery resource management, 
which we refer to as “comanagement.” Comanagement can be accomplished through a 
partnership or other power-sharing arrangement with [[[original wasn’t clear, this is what I think 
you mean]]]authorities (Jentoft 2003) or the TURF-granted community can opt to manage the 
resource on its own, so-called community-based management (Charles 2006). In either case, the 
key features of fishery comanagement are that fishermen form a group to manage the fishery in a 
collective manner based on mutually agreed rules and that some form of exclusive access 
rights—a TURF or a limited number of licenses—is granted to such a group. This regime is 
different from an ITQ because, within the context of rights-based management, it involves 
centralized and coordinated decision-making. 
  Fishery comanagement has recently garnered considerable interest from both fishermen 
and regulators and from developed and developing countries. For example, there is some 
momentum behind movements to establish coop-based fishery comanagement in a variety of 
North American fisheries based on the success of newly established cooperatives in Pacific 
whiting and Bering Sea pollack fisheries. In developing countries, where the enforcement 3 
capacity of authorities is weak and market infrastructures are fragile, for market-based regimes to 
be feasible, comanagement may be the only hope for rational management. In fact, 
community-based fishery comanagement has been actively promoted both by local governments 
and by international aid institutions (e.g., Asian Development Bank 1995). 
  Despite all of the interests, attention, and worldwide applications (Cunningham and 
Bostock 2005; Wilson et al. 2003), fishery comanagement remains poorly understood. 
Economists have been skeptical about the effectiveness and sustainability of comanagement 
regimes primarily because they involve collective action by individual fishermen. Economists 
argue, for example, that, even if the incumbents cooperate and manage to enhance the economic 
rents from the fishery, success will attract new entrants to the industry, consequently dissipating 
that rent. If the incumbent fishermen anticipate this happening, then cooperation might not take 
place at all. Comanagement might also be vulnerable to cheating. Contrary to these theoretical 
predictions, however, there are many successful cases of comanagement that has endured and 
maintained a high rate of compliance (see, for example, Cunningham and Bostock (2005), 
Platteau and Seki (2001), and Uchida (2004a)). This anecdotal evidence calls for more in-depth 
analysis of comanagement of common-pool resources. 
  Other disciplines such as sociology and political science, in addition to economics, have 
conducted many case studies on comanagement of common-pool resources. Some researchers 
have derived conditions that are critical for successful comanagement, such as characteristics of 
the resource and institutional arrangements (e.g., Agrawal 2001; Baland and Platteau 1996; 
Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002; Wade 1988). Examples include maintaining small group size, 
cultural homogeneity, frequent communication among members, and practices of reciprocity (all 
user characteristics) and stationarity[[[???]]] and storage capability (both being resource 
characteristics) (Ostrom et al. 2002, p. 450). However, these studies seem to share a common 4 
assumption that fishermen will fundamentally deviate from agreed rules since it is not in their 
best economic interest to comply with those rules. All of the factors in the preceding list are 
necessary conditions for reducing the cost of monitoring and enforcement aimed at preventing 
fishermen from deviating from the rules. This leaves us with one pressing question: Is there a way 
to alter fishermen’s incentives so that their individual interests are aligned with that of a group, 
community, or society as a whole? 
  Understanding the incentives and consequent behavior by fishermen is the key to 
analyzing fishery comanagement. If adhering to the comanagement regime by complying with its 
rules and thereby achieving the group’s goals is in each fisherman’s interest, then the burden of 
monitoring and enforcement can be significantly reduced. Fishermen’s incentives can be altered 
by the “rules of the game.” ITQ is one such example; in the context of comanagement, ITQ is the 
design of the self-imposed set of rules and the organizational structure by which the group 
manages the resource. 
  This paper analyzes the influence of the rules of the game adopted by comanagement 
groups on economic outcomes. For this purpose, we look to the Japanese experience with coastal 
fisheries management. Our primary reason for this choice is the abundant cases of fishery 
comanagement regimes in Japan as virtually all coastal inshore fisheries are governed by 
fishermen’s groups. These self-governing bodies composed of local fishermen are called fishery 
cooperative associations (FCAs). Fishery comanagement is carried out by fishery management 
organizations (FMOs), which are autonomous groups of fishermen who are typically chosen by 
their parent FCAs (Makino and Matsuda 2005). An FMO can be simply an FCA or it can be a 
subgroup of FCA members or an alliance of fishermen from multiple FCAs (Uchida 2004b). We 
know of no study that has looked at FMOs nationwide and analyzed the relationship between 5 
their characteristics and performance using variations in their operations, management measures, 
and economic performance. 
  The advantage of studying Japanese cases to understand comanagement is that there were 
1,608 FMOs in Japan in 2003 (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) 2006). 
These FMOs differ in terms of types of fishing gear used, targeted species, membership size, and 
implemented management measures. Yet, unlike the case of a multicountry analysis, they all 
function under the same national fishery rules and laws and, to some extent, their cultural and 
social characteristics are identical. Japanese FMOs are ideal subjects for our research because, 
unlike a multicountry analysis of a small number of observations from each country, as is often 
seen in the comanagement literature (Agrawal 2001), the Japanese case offers wide variations in 
key fishery-related variables while other influential and difficult-to-observe disturbances are 
controlled. 
  The focus of our analysis, derived from multiple sources of anecdotal evidence, is 
centered on two specific measures employed by many successful FMOs: fishing effort 
coordination and pooling arrangements (details of these rules are explained in the next section). 
Our aim is to determine whether these two measures are in fact significantly correlated with 
higher economic returns as measured by fishery revenue. Furthermore, we examine whether 
having both measures in place results in better performance than comanagement regimes in which   
there is none or only one measure, based on the notion by Platteau and Seki (2001) that pooling 
arrangements are supporting mechanisms for effort coordination, thus suggesting that the two are 
most effective when employed together. We find that fishermen participating in FMOs with effort 
coordination and pooling arrangements tend to generate the greatest economic returns, and the 
source of the return originates mainly from coordinated marketing practices. We also find that the 
number of members in the group has no significant impact, contrary to a popular proposition set 6 
forth by Olson (1965) and his followers. The main message of this paper is that comanagement 
achieves its highest potential, in terms of generating economic returns, when fishing effort and 
marketing practices are well-coordinated and that pooling arrangements support the effectiveness 
of such coordination by altering fishermen’s incentive structures. 
  A final note on why it is worthwhile to study Japanese fishery co-management regimes is 
in order, as some might argue that Japan’s experience is based on its unique historical, cultural, 
and social characteristics and thus that its applicability in other parts of the world is limited. 
Firstly, through our interviews with Japanese fishermen, we came to conclude that they are just as 
competitive as entrepreneurs and no more cooperative-minded than fishermen elsewhere. 
Cohesiveness of the community surely would enhance the likelihood of cooperation and 
compliance, but such social characteristics can be readily observed in small coastal communities 
outside of Japan. The notion that Japanese fishermen are more cooperative, thus enabling 
comanagement to flourish, is anything but true. 
  Secondly, it is true that Japanese fishery comanagement and operation of the country’s 
FMOs hinges on two unique institutions. One is the aforementioned FCAs and the other is fishing 
rights, a Japanese version of TURFs that is protected by law. The historical evolution of these 
institutions and their administrative structures is well documented in the literature (Asada et al. 
1983; Makino and Matsuda 2005; Ruddle 1987; Yamamoto 1995). However, there seems to be 
an overemphasis on the historical background of these institutions, which has often led to a 
conclusion that Japanese success is due mainly to its traditional strength of cooperation. We argue 
that, while the two institutions themselves may be unique, the functions they perform can be 
thought of as universal. Fishery comanagement can be conceptually characterized by applying the 
framework of the theory of clubs (Buchanan 1965), which asserts that impure public goods such 
as fishery resources can be converted into club goods if (1) geographical and membership 7 
boundaries are defined and enforced and (2) members are better off than nonmembers. FCAs’ 
membership control and TURF’s boundaries are designed to meet the first condition, but nothing 
requires that these are the only method to meet this condition.[[[vague, confusing]]] It is the 
functions of FCAs and TURFs that are important, and they are generally widely applicable.
1 The 
second condition, in our context, is that the benefits of fishery comanagement perceived by FMO 
members are sufficiently high. This is an issue that has little relevance to tradition, and Japanese 
experience can provide hints about ways to meet, or avoid failing to meet, this condition. 
2. Effort coordination and pooling arrangements: An overview 
The management regime employed by FMOs can vary from simple to sophisticated. As a starting 
point, it must be remembered that simply having an allocation of allowable harvest assigned to a 
group like an FMO does not necessarily correct fishermen’s incentives and behavior. One end of 
the spectrum is thus no different than a conventional limited-entry program in which a limited 
group is given unallocated rights to a total allowable catch. This configuration would likely invite 
race-to-fish incentives, which are well documented in the literature. A simple comanagement 
regime is one in which operational and output restrictions are self-imposed, leaving other fishing 
decisions to individual fishermen. At the other end of the spectrum is the corporate or sole-owner 
model in which operations of the FMO are completely coordinated to maximize total profits. 
Then there is a range of options in the middle that is characterized by group agreement on broad 
rules of behavior, leaving an opportunity for individual initiative and decision-making by 
participants. 
                                                 
1  For details of how FCA and TURF systems achieve these conditions, see Uchida (2004b). 8 
  From our examination of successful FMOs in Japan, it became apparent that two 
interesting features, which we refer to as “effort coordination” and “pooling arrangements,” were 
often present. Effort coordination involves individual fishing operations that are coordinated with 
the goal of increasing the efficiency of the overall fishing effort. This includes, but is not limited 
to, eliminating the race-to-fish incentive and avoiding congestion at fishing grounds, which also 
reduces potential damage and loss of fishing gear. Typical methods employed to achieve these 
objectives are fishing-ground rotations and/or assignments, alternating fishing days, joint 
searches/assessments of fish stocks, and, in some cases, joint ownership of vessels and fishing 
gear. Through well-conducted effort coordination, FMOs are able to solve spatial and temporal 
issues of efficient allocation of fishing effort. 
  A pooling arrangement is an agreement among FMO members by which harvests, 
revenues, and/or profits are pooled and then distributed back to members.
2 The redistribution 
rule is either uniform (all participating fishing units receive the same amount) or weighted by 
indicators such as vessel size and number of crew members. In the literature, a pooling 
arrangement is typically characterized as a supporting mechanism for effort coordination (Baba 
1991; Gaspart and Seki 2003; Hasegawa 1985; Platteau and Seki 2001; Uchida 2004a). This is 
because, in essence, effort coordination is a restriction of individual freedom-of-fishing decisions 
and the differentials in harvest levels resulting from effort coordination must be addressed and 
adjusted. A pooling arrangement is a method for handling this differential problem. 
  The key element of a pooling arrangement is that it breaks the link between the individual 
fishing effort applied and actual earnings received. This dampens the incentive to compete 
aggressively, which is favorable in light of the excessive fishing effort that is applied in the 
                                                 
2  Pooling arrangements, as considered here, do not include insurance purposes, as in risk pooling, since such fishery 
insurance is already offered by FCAs. 9 
absence of comanagement. It also aligns the incentive gradient of individual fishermen to that of 
a group: if a fisherman wishes to maximize his slice of a pie, then he must maximize the total size 
of that pie. This implies, for example, that it becomes an individual’s personal interest to avoid 
flooding the market and depressing the market price, which would lead to voluntary restraining of 
harvests. However, a pooling arrangement is a double-edged sword: if the incentive-dampening 
effect goes too far, shirking problems can undermine the FMO’s stability. The higher economic 
return from comanagement, particularly when that management includes a pooling arrangement, 
thus becomes critical in sustaining the comanagement regime. 
  Anecdotal evidence shows that there are many FMOs with pooling arrangements that are 
functioning reasonably well. Platteau and Seki (2001) surveyed fishermen in Toyama Bay, where 
there were two FMOs with pooling arrangements that operated under different FCAs but targeted 
the same species.
3 Uchida (2004a) studied another FMO with a pooling arrangement in Suruga 
Bay; in that case, fishermen from two FCAs that target the same species formed one unified FMO. 
This FMO has adopted a sophisticated fishing effort-coordination scheme, including harvest 
control to avoid market gluts and collective promotion of their products to consumers as part of 
its marketing activities. In both cases, the pooling arrangements function as a supporting 
mechanism for—and perhaps even facilitating—fine-tuned effort-coordination measures. 
  The number of FMOs with pooling arrangements is increasing over time. According to 
the tenth fishery census, 294 of 1,734 FMOs had implemented some variation of pooling 
arrangements (MAFF 2001). Among those, roughly half, or 144, FMOs had a uniform 
distribution system and 129[[[these numbers don’t add up; should they?]]] had a weighted 
                                                 
3  Platteau and Seki (2001) refer to the pooling arrangements as the “pooling system.” 10 
distribution system. The share of FMOs with pooling arrangements had risen from 11% in 1988 
to 15.6% in 1993 and to 17% in 1998 (MAFF 1991, 1996, 2001).
4 
3. Empirical model and data 
General model 
We use revenues as a measure of economic performance for the FMOs. Ideally, one would like to 
use profit for such purposes since FMOs can be effective in reducing operational costs through 
either direct coordination or recovery of resource stock levels. The data sets we use, as we 
explain hereafter, provided neither profit nor cost information. Cost information is difficult to 
obtain in general because fishermen and their vessels are often involved in multiple fisheries 
simultaneously; that is, not only do seasons for multiple fisheries overlap but they can operate in 
multiple fisheries in a single day. With such operations, it becomes difficult to determine how 
much of total costs can be attributed to a specific fishery since fishermen typically do not keep 
records of time and other information that might be useful to determine that cost. 
  There are circumstances in which revenue is a suitable and plausible choice for our 
research purpose. A fishery-related total cost for small-scale fishers such as those considered in 
this paper is typically dominated by large fixed costs. In fact, in interviews with Japanese 
fishermen and vessel owners, they stated that variable costs such as fuel per trip are not 
significant compared to fixed costs such as mortgage payments for their vessels and equipment. 
In such a case, the vessel owners’ incentive is to maximize revenue by keeping their vessels in 
operation as much as possible during the season to cover those fixed costs (Kirkley and Strand 
                                                 
4 The share declined in the most recent (eleventh) census to 12% (MAFF 2006), but since the eleventh census 
redefined FMOs drastically, the relationship of this figure to the previous census is not clear. 11 
1988). Also of note is that many of the variable costs, such as fuel, packing materials, and ice, are 
already discounted through joint purchases by the FMOs’ parent FCAs, which is an additional 
justification for using revenue as a measure of economic performance. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
  Explanatory variables of particular interest are effort coordination, pooling arrangements, 
and marketing activities. Marketing activities can be subdivided into two groups: one that is 
predominantly price-enhancement oriented and one that is oriented towards demand enhancement 
(Figure 1). Ex-vessel market-price-enhancing activities include quality control and 
self-processing to add value to products. Expansions of sales channels by means of advertisement 
and branding strategies, both with the aim of increasing demand, can lead to increased landing 
volumes and a higher market price. 
  Effort coordination can have both direct and indirect effects on revenue. Direct effects 
occur when the total landing volume is controlled to avoid market flooding, which may contribute 
to enhanced ex-vessel market prices. Indirect effects occur when marketing activities are 
conducted as part of effort coordination. Similarly, pooling arrangements may directly reduce the 
landing volume through mitigated race-to-fish incentives or to some extent due to shirking, or 
may influence revenue through reinforcement of effort coordination. 
  There are other variables that influence revenue levels and must be controlled. For landing 
volume (i.e., the harvest), the variables are the level of capital capacity such as vessel size; 
fishing methods and gear types; and other fishing coordination efforts such as annual fishing days 
and hours. The level of fish stocks will also influence the harvest level, but reliable data for that 
parameter were not available. On the market-price side, covariates include the species type 12 
targeted and its geographical location since place of origin is often used as part of a branding 
strategy. Some FMOs have been successful in branding their products. 
Data sets 
In our analysis, we utilized two different data sets. These data sets complement each other in the 
information they contain but are not compatible in the sense that they cannot be merged to create 
a single data set. Thus, we conducted separate analyses with each data set. 
  Before getting into the details of the data, explanations of terminologies used henceforth 
are in order. Fishing units are economic entities engaged in fisheries for commercial purposes. 
Fishing districts are defined as a community within the boundaries of a local municipality that 
operates fisheries under a common environment, such as sharing the same fishing rights area 
(TURF) and commonalities in other fishery-related activities. Generally speaking, there is one 
TURF and an FCA that administers it in each fishing district. Due to recent trends of mergers of 
FCAs, however, this is changing rapidly. After mergers, former FCAs often remain as branch 
offices and retain much of their independence in guiding fishery operations. 
  The first data set is the fishery census compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries of Japan (MAFF). The census is conducted at five-year intervals and surveys 
fishing units to collect data on fishing operations, equipment, revenues, and other fishing and 
household characteristics. It also collects data on fishery organizations such as FMOs. It is the 
most comprehensive fishery data collected and made available to the public in Japan. 
  The main advantage of the census data is its large number of observations and its potential 
to form a panel data set that will enable us to control for time-invariant unobservables with 
fixed-effects models. However, the census data also falls short in two important areas. One is that 
the published census data are aggregated at the fishing-district level and so report only either sum 13 
or average values. Hence, our unit of observation is restricted to the fishing-district level. Due to 
confidentiality issues, data compiled at the fishing-unit level are not available from MAFF. More 
details about this issue and remedies for it are explained in subsequent sections. Another problem 
is that the census does not collect information on effort-coordination practices by FMOs. This is a 
huge setback as effort coordination is one of the core factors under investigation, which led us to 
acquire the second data set. 
  The second data set comes from a survey we conducted. Since there were no readily 
available data sets on effort coordination at the level of detail that was required, we developed a 
mail survey that was implemented in 2005. 
  The main challenge in conducting the mail survey was to identify which FMOs to include. 
Ideally, we wanted to send the survey to all FMOs nationwide but we quickly realized that this 
was not possible. The main complication is that contact information for all of Japan’s FMOs does 
not exist, primarily because FMOs are autonomous organizations. One option was to send the 
survey to all of the fishery cooperatives (FCAs) since their contact information is publicly 
available. However, there are many cases in which there are two or more FMOs within a single 
fishery cooperative and we were advised that a survey sent to generic recipients (not to specific 
FMOs) would tend to get red-taped and receive no attention. For these reasons, it became clear 
that a list of specific contact information for the FMOs was needed, which led us to use the list of 
FMOs from a prior survey conducted in 1997.
5  As a result, 386 surveys were sent and 116 usable 
responses were received. 
                                                 
5  The 1997 survey, conducted by the Japanese government, was sent to regional government officers associated with 
FMOs located within their jurisdictions, who then answered the survey on behalf of the FMOs. Our survey differs 
from the previous one in two important ways: (1) our survey was sent directly to FMO managers instead of to the 
government officials who oversee them, and (2) our questions were focused in great detail on effort coordination, 
pooling arrangements, and other self-imposed regulations and on fishing operations in general. 14 
  The advantage of survey data lies in the details provided regarding not only effort 
coordination but also pooling arrangements, other self-imposed regulations, and marketing 
activities. The disadvantage is the relatively small number of observations provided. In this case, 
after eliminating responses that were only partially complete, we had 67 data points for use in the 
subsequent regression. 
  In sum, we could not combine and merge the two data sets since the census collected data 
at the fishing-district level and the survey collected data at the FMO level. We instead exploited 
the advantages that each data set possesses—which correspond to the disadvantages of the 
other—to investigate the impact of effort coordination, pooling arrangements, and marketing 
activities on fishery revenue.   
4. Census data results on pooling arrangements 
Data issues and remedies 
The unit of observation in the census is fishing district and the fact that the census data are 
aggregated at the fishing-district level poses some problems. There are six categories of fishing 
units defined in the fishery census: individuals (typically fishing households), corporations, FCAs, 
production cooperative associations (PCAs), joint operations (two or more individuals jointly 
operating (JO)), and others (government agencies and research institutions). Individual fishing 
units include only those who own and operate the business; hired fishermen are excluded. 
  Table 1 clearly shows that levels of average revenue differ substantially between 
individuals and other types of operations. Furthermore, the distribution of the fishing unit types is 
not symmetric between FMO participants and nonparticipants (henceforth “FMO units” and 
“non-FMO units” respectively); in other words, a majority of nonindividual fishing units do not 15 
participate in FMOs. These observations imply that one must control for the fishing unit type to 
examine the impact of FMOs on average revenue. However, since average revenue and other 
variables are aggregated into a single data point per fishing district, the ability to control for 
fishing unit type is imperfect. The remedy is to focus on districts that have only individual fishing 
units. In that way, the individual fishing units are overwhelmingly dominant among both FMO 
units and non-FMO units. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  Our primary interest in evaluating the census data is whether (1) fishery comanagement 
by FMOs brings higher revenues to member fishermen and, if so, (2) the degree to which such 
returns differ between FMOs that do and do not have pooling arrangements and marketing 
activities. Ideally, one would want data on each fishing unit with information on whether that unit 
is an FMO or a non-FMO unit. The census, however, provides only the mean of all fishing units 
in a district and the mean conditional on FMO units. In other words, for some variable  x, each 
fishing district i has data of the form 
1
j j Nx
− ∑  and 
1
j jF M O Nx
−
∈ ∑  where the subscript  j  
denotes the fishing unit. With these data, we computed average values for non-FMO units. The 
dependent variable, which is average fishery revenue, was computed in this manner. In what 
follows, we separated the data for each variable into FMO units and non-FMO units within each 
district so that we could estimate the impact of FMOs using the dummy variable method. 
  The variables for fishing capital recorded in the census include the average number of 
boats or vessels owned, vessel tonnage, and vessel engine horsepower. Boats and vessels are 
divided into three categories: “nonpowered boats” have no engines attached; “externally powered 16 
boats” are defined as those with external engines attached to otherwise nonpowered boats; and 
“vessels” are those with integrated engines. Tonnage and engine horsepower are reported for the 
vessel category only. The number of boats and vessels is reported per fishing unit whereas the 
averages for tonnage and horsepower are defined per vessel per unit to incorporate the fact that 
one unit might own two or more vessels and one vessel might be jointly owned by two or more 
units. 
  The census provides data on the total number of FMOs that use pooling arrangements in a 
fishing district and a breakdown list for uniform, weighted, and other forms of distribution rules. 
The problem is that if, for example, there are three FMOs in a fishing district and only two have 
pooling arrangements, then the average revenue of the FMO units in the district is a composite of 
two FMOs with pooling arrangements and one FMO without them. Since there is no way to 
decompose the single observation of average revenue, we constructed the share of FMOs with 
pooling arrangements for each distribution rule ( s ) in each fishing district,  is POOL , . Let 
() 1 Sks ,=  if an FMO k  has pooling arrangement s  and  ( ) 0 Sks , =  otherwise. Then the 
share  is POOL ,  is 
()Number of FMOs with pooling arrangement









== . ∑  
Note that one unit can at most implement one type of pooling arrangement but some FMOs have 
none. Thus, the shares do not necessarily sum to one. The share of FMOs with any pooling 
arrangement is   
  ii s
s
POOL POOL , = . ∑  
  The census records marketing activities by FMOs. Subcategories of marketing activities 
as defined in the census are (a) keeping the catch alive (“live”), (b) quality control (“quality”), (c) 17 
“processing” (dressing, etc.), (d) expanding sales channels (“sales”), and (e) transportation 
improvement (“transportation”). Activities (a) and (b) are grouped together as “onboard” 
activities while the rest are grouped as “on-land” activities. The fishery census reports the number 
of FMOs engaged in any of these marketing activities. If an FMO is engaged in two or more 
marketing activities, it is recorded in one[[[seems to be word missing here]]] of those activities. 
The marketing variables are constructed as the share of FMOs engaged in a certain marketing 
practice (m ) over the total number of FMOs in that fishing district. Let  ( ) 1 Mkm ,=   if an FMO 
k  has engaged in marketing practice  m  and  ( ) 0 Mkm , =  otherwise. Then the share  im MKT,  
is calculated as[[[below, “marketing activities” perhaps should be marketing activity”- singular 
used just above]]] 
() Number of FMOs engaged in marketing activities









== . ∑  
Since one FMO can engage in multiple marketing activities, the shares could sum to more than 








= , ∑  
where  () 1 Mk=  if FMO  k  is engaged in at least one marketing practice and  () 0 Mk=  
otherwise.  
Descriptive statistics of census data 
A panel data set was formed from the ninth and tenth fishery censuses, which were conducted in 
1993 and 1998[[[I think it’s obvious so no need to state]]]. Although the first census was 
conducted in the late 1940s, data on FMOs have been collected only since 1988. A closer 
examination revealed that some details of the census data have changed over the years. The 1988 18 
census is incompatible with the two that followed it (1993 and 1998) and the results from the 
2003 census are not available yet. 
  The unconditional mean of fishery revenue for FMO units was higher than that of 
non-FMO units for both 1993 and 1998. But while FMO units’ average revenue decreased over 
this period by approximately $400, average revenue for non-FMO units increased by nearly 
$2,000. This may be due in part to the increase in vessel tonnage and engine horsepower that 
occurred during that period: non-FMO units on average shifted toward larger vessels with more 
powerful engines while FMO units changed little. Another possibility is the decline in fishing 
days. Although fishing days declined for both FMO units and non-FMO units, the magnitude was 
much larger for FMO units ( 75 −.  days) than for non-FMO units ( 33 − .  days). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  Fishing capacity remained mostly unchanged for FMO units. The number of boats and 
vessels increased only slightly and vessel engine power decreased. The same pattern can be seen 
in non-FMO units for number of boats and vessels, but, as previously mentioned, tonnage and 
engine power increased by fair margins. Since the number of vessels did not increase as much, 
this indicates that non-FMO units switched to larger vessels, a typical pattern under the free 
competition associated with TURFs. Another interesting result is the stark difference in the levels 
of vessel tonnage and engine power between FMO and non-FMO units. These figures are 
calculated on a per-vessel per-unit basis to incorporate the fact that one vessel might be jointly 
owned by two or more units. Thus, this result suggests that some FMOs have shifted to joint 
ownership of vessels, and possibly of other fishing gear, to rationalize their inputs. 19 
  Pooling arrangements were implemented by 17.6% and 20.8% of FMOs in the sample in 
1993 and 1998, respectively. There were more FMOs with weighted distributions than with 
uniform distributions in both years. Under weighted distribution schemes, weights are based on 
factors such as landing volume to mitigate the incentive to shirk, a downside of pooling 
arrangements. The net effect of the two opposing incentives is an empirical question. Other 
weighting schemes include consideration of vessel tonnage, which is intended to compensate for 
the cost differential due to vessel investment. This scheme does not distort the (short-run) 
incentive structure for a fisherman. However, it is not commonly seen because vessels in the 
same fishery vary little in size (tonnage and engine horsepower); thanks to the race-to-fish 
incentive, all vessels are typically the maximum size allowed by the regulations imposed by the 
central or local government. 
  Nearly half of the FMOs in the sample engaged in marketing activities, with onboard 
activities being more popular than on-land ones. This is intuitive given that these are probably 
what the fishermen are best at pursuing. The lack of popularity of landing the catch alive (“live”) 
probably derives from the fact that it involves a significant upfront investment for things such as 
building fish tanks in vessels and purchasing devices that control water temperature. 
  In sum, key FMO-related activities for which data are available, namely pooling 
arrangements and marketing activities, were employed by the majority of the FMOs in 1998. As 
these institutional arrangements and activities are costly to set up and maintain, we would expect 
that there must be a significant economic return for such investment.   
Model specification 
The base model is a semilog function:   20 
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where  it CAP   is a vector of fishing capital variables and  it POOL  and  it MKT  are  pooling  and 
marketing shares that we previously defined. Since vessel tonnage and engine power is highly 
correlated, only the tonnage variable is included in the estimation model.  it R   is average revenue 
per fishing unit in a district.  it DAYS   is the average number of fishing days, which includes days 
that a fisherman was engaged in any fishery-related activities, whether offshore or onshore. 
Onshore activities include not only maintenance of fishing gear but also various marketing 
activities.  12 T =,   is the time-trend variable and  i Z   is a vector of time-invariant 
fishing-district-specific variables, including gear type, targeted species, and other unobservables. 
ir t CPI ∈, is consumer price index (CPI) data reported from Bank of Japan with base year 2000, 
which we included to capture the general trend of price changes over the analyzed periods. The 
data set contains the CPI for ten regions in Japan and is denoted by subscript  r . This captures 
region-specific trends, something that is more desirable than using the nationwide average. Lastly, 
it ε   is the error term. 
  In addition to the preceding variables, we included the number of units as a covariate 
( it UNITS ). The general impact of the number of units on fishery revenue per unit is ambiguous. 
Large numbers of units in a fishery may, on one hand, intensify competition, which could lead to 
a downward spiral of large landing volumes, market flooding, lowered prices and revenues, and 
increased subsequent harvests to make up for the decline. On the other hand, large numbers of 
vessels may facilitate joint production in the fishery and increase per-unit revenue. Then there is 
the FMO-specific impact of the number of units; ceteris paribus, the smaller the membership’s 
size, the better the chance of success in comanagement (Agrawal 2001; Olson 1965). To 21 
incorporate this effect, the interaction term of  it UNITS   and the FMO indicator variable ( it FMO ) 
were included. 
  We took the first-difference transformation of the base model (1) to control for the fixed 
effects: 
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POOL CAP MKT  
where  Δ denotes the first difference between 1998 ( 2 t = ) and 1993 ( 1 t = ). We chose the 
first-difference model over the alternative fixed-effects models because the former also controls 
for potential serial correlation of the error term while the latter does not.
6 The estimates of 
coefficients, on the other hand, are identical for the two methods (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
  Note that this transformation was done separately for each FMO and non-FMO unit’s data 
set. That is, for any given fishing district  i  there will be at most two observations: one for FMO 
units and another for non-FMO units. The focus is to capture whether changes in average revenue 
differ between FMO units and non-FMO units by adding an FMO dummy variable,  i FMO . The 
estimation model thus becomes   
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POOL CAP MKT (2) 
where 1 i FMO =   for an observation of an FMO unit in district  i and  0 i FMO =  otherwise.  
  An important consequence of this method is that observations in which FMO/non-FMO 
units disappeared or newly emerged between the two periods are not included in the sample. This 
may seem odd since such observations are commonly used in the literature to assess the treatment 
effects, which in our context is the formation (or dissolution) of FMOs. The justification for this 
approach is that the number of such observations (i.e., fishing districts) is very small.   22 
Regression results 
The results from heteroskedastic-robust ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are presented in 
Table 3. Models 1 through 4 differ by specification of  i POOL Δ  and  i MKT Δ ; all other 
covariates included in the regressions are identical. There are 459 observations, of which 126 are 
FMO units. All models rejected the null hypothesis for an overall  F   test at the 1% significance 
level. Adjusted R
2 s were all in the neighborhood of 0.26–0.27.   
  The FMO dummy variable was estimated to have no statistical significance in explaining 
the change in average fishery revenue, although the signs were all positive. Since the panel has 
only two periods, the estimation results for within-fixed-effect, first-difference, and pooled OLS 
models are all identical (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). This implies that the FMO dummy variable 
is statistically insignificant with respect to not only the change in revenue but also the revenue 
level after controlling for covariates. This suggests that the mere existence of an FMO has only a 
marginal impact, if any, on fishery revenue per unit in a fishing district. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Contrary to our prior expectations, the marketing variables showed no statistical significance in 
all model specifications. The estimated signs of onboard activities were positive and on-land 
activities were negative (model 2 and model 4). Considering that fishermen are likely to have 
more expertise in onboard activities relative to on-land activities, this is an intuitive result. 
Models with subcategories of onboard and on-land marketing activities were also estimated 
(model 2 and 4), but none had statistical significance. 
                                                                                                                                                              
6  Note that this is only true for a two-period panel. 23 
  It might be the case that not all marketing activities pursued by FMOs were effective and 
that fact is affecting the preceding results. There are no specific measurements of marketing 
effectiveness, but it is a plausible hypothesis that FMOs with pooling arrangements are more 
effective when marketing is included. For example, freed fishing effort that results from curtailed 
fishing under a pooling arrangement could be diverted to marketing efforts. Since, with the 
pooling arrangement, individual shares increase as total revenue increases, FMO units will have 
stronger incentives to make marketing activities effective. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
  To test this hypothesis, we ran additional regressions based on model 1 and model 2 with 
a new variable,  ii POOL MKT Δ× Δ   (Table 4). The overall marketing effect of FMOs with pooling 
arrangements is now positive with a t-value of 1.19 (model 1a). In model 2a, the onboard 
marketing variable has a much higher t-value and the on-land marketing variable now has a 
positive estimated sign. Although none were statistically significant at the 10% level or higher, 
these changes suggest that marketing activities are more effective when proffered by some kind 
of collective action mechanism such as a pooling arrangement. 
  The estimated coefficients for pooling arrangements were positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Such was not the case when estimated with subdivided variables 
defined by the distribution rules, but the results suggest that weighted distribution rules have 
more influence than uniform distribution rules. As aforementioned, weighted distribution rules 
distort incentives in the opposite direction that pooling arrangements do. The primary motivation 
for implementing this rule is often focused mainly on what can be referred to as “fairness 24 
restoration.” With pooling arrangements, fishermen with greater skills are disproportionately 
taxed and are thus typically dissatisfied with the new rule. The possibility of these 
high-line[[[??]]] fishermen leaving or blocking the agreement could seriously undermine the 
FMO itself. For this reason, some FMOs implement a landing-volume-based weighted 
distribution rule to award or to compensate those with a reputation for large catches. This 
explains the relative significance of the weighted distribution rule over the uniform rule. However, 
it is conceivable that finding the “right” weights that optimally balance incentives to shirk and to 
race to fish is difficult, which could be the cause of the statistically insignificant results. 
  The question remains as to whether the pooling arrangement per se, by altering incentives 
for fishermen, is positively influencing revenue or not. The results could instead be capturing the 
effect of effort coordination through pooling arrangements, since the two are often implemented 
together (Platteau and Seki 2001). One cannot verify or test this hypothesis with the census data 
because the data do not include information on effort coordination. A direct assessment of effort 
coordination on fishery revenues is investigated in the next section using the survey data. 
5. Survey results on effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements 
This section examines the impact of FMOs that employ effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements on fishery revenues. In particular, several important, unanswered questions remain 
about the actual relationships and interactions between effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements employed by FMOs. In the literature, pooling arrangements are thought of as 
support systems that help effort-coordination operations function effectively (Baba 1991; 
Hasegawa 1985; Platteau and Seki 2001). However, the literature on this topic is drawn from a 25 
few select cases and does not provide a cross-sectional overview of how these measures actually 
are employed and perform. Are effort coordination and pooling arrangements generally employed 
as a pair? Are the cases where only one measure is employed exceptions? Do effort coordination 
and pooling arrangements perform better if they are implemented together rather than 
individually? 
 The  effort-coordination  variable  is defined as (a) fishing-grounds rotations or assignments, 
(b) exchanges of information about fishing grounds, and (c) joint ownership of fishing vessels 
and gear. Table 5 shows the number of FMOs in our sample in each category of combinations of 
effort coordination and pooling arrangements employed. There are significant numbers of FMOs 
that use only effort coordination (Type B) or only pooling arrangements (Type C). This suggests 
that these arrangements probably are not simply transitional or exceptional institutions. Having 
both effort coordination and pooling arrangements as a pair (Type A) is not necessarily the norm 
so the question becomes whether there is a significant benefit to having both. Type D is defined 
as FMOs that employ neither. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Descriptive statistics of survey data 
As a way of measuring the economic performance of an FMO, we focus on revenue per unit of 
effort (henceforth RPUE), which is defined as the revenue from a managed fishery per member 
per fishing hour. The unconditional means of RPUE ranged from 102.1 thousand yen (about 
$928) for Type A FMOs to 3.7 thousand yen ($34) for Type D FMOs (Table 6). These estimates 
are considerably higher than the revenue per unit derived from the census data. An important 26 
difference is that, in the census data, the average revenue for the FMO units was a composite of 
all of the fisheries that a unit works—that is, the average could include both FMO-managed and 
nonmanaged fisheries. Also, the RPUE for Type A FMOs, which seems extremely high, is 
comparable to that for units in the small pink shrimp fishery, a well-known FMO-managed 
fishery documented in Uchida (2004a). Note that these are gross revenues before subtracting any 
expenses for vessels, crews, shore-side facilities, etc. 
  From the descriptive statistics alone, there seems to be good reason to believe that FMOs 
with effort coordination and pooling arrangements enjoy greater revenue per unit of effort than 
FMOs without these arrangements. Indeed, simple t-tests among the means indicate that the 
Type A FMOs’ RPUE is statistically different from the values for Types B and D but not for 
Type C. Type B FMOs’ RPUE was statistically significantly different only from the value for 
Type D, which was not the case between Type C and Type D. This weakly suggests that effort 
coordination and pooling arrangements are more effective when implemented together. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
  One of the distinctive differences among FMO types is the number of fishing days per 
year. Most notably, Type A FMO members spend far less time fishing than Type B or Type D 
FMO members do. Table 6 seems to suggest that members of FMOs with pooling arrangements 
(Types A and C) tend to fish fewer days than fishers of the other two types. This is intuitive since 
under the pooling arrangement there is less incentive to go out fishing in bad weather, for 
example, relative to behavior under individualistic competition. Type B FMOs show a number of 
fishing days that is similar to Type D FMOs. A possible explanation for this result is that, for 
Type B, “fairness adjustments” in response to effort coordination must be made by providing 27 
equal chances of fishing at any given fishing ground to a vessel in a season (the pooling 
arrangement removes the need for this adjustment for Type A FMOs). Depending on the size of 
the membership of an FMO, this equity constraint may translate to maintaining a certain 
minimum number of days of fishing per year, and the more the number of days, the easier to 
make that adjustment. Fishing hours per fishing day are not much different across FMO types 
except for Type D, which, on average, exhibits much longer hours per day. This suggests that 
fishing effort may be more concentrated, presumably around the most profitable times. 
  If Type A FMOs are earning higher revenue per unit of effort, one might expect that, 
ceteris paribus, (1) the size of the membership of these FMOs would be smaller than for other 
types (e.g., Agrawal 2001) and (2) FMOs would successfully attract younger generations (i.e., 
successors) to the fishery. Regarding the first point, FMOs of Type A through Type C have fewer 
members than Type D, but Type A is certainly not the smallest. The average age of FMO 
members is lower for Type A but not significantly so, and the same is true for the average number 
of years as a fisher. Thus, the preceding two hypotheses do not seem to be supported by this 
sample. 
  Fishing vessels and gear are still largely owned by individuals rather than by the FMOs as 
institutions. For Type A FMOs, for instance, it might seem natural to bring inputs such as vessels 
and gear under joint ownership, just as is done for revenues (i.e., pooling arrangements), to fully 
rationalize the operation and maximize profit. Table 6 shows that such a trend, if it exists at all, is 
still in progress. Interviews with managers of some of the most progressive FMOs confessed the 
difficulty of persuading members to spare their own vessels in the interest of increasing group 
profit through joint ownership of fewer (and possibly larger) vessels. 28 
Model specification 
The dependent variable is average revenue per unit of effort of an FMO  i ( i rpue ). The first set 
of covariates is composed of the dummy variables for Type A through Type C FMOs; the Type D 
dummy is excluded to avoid multicollinearity. 
  It is common knowledge that certain harvested species generally command higher prices 
than other species. For example, spiny lobsters and certain species of crab (e.g., snow crab) are 
generally considered to be high-end or luxury foods and thus are traded at higher prices. Thus, 
one must control for the FMOs’ main targeted species. On the other hand, caution is required in 
including species-type variables in the model. If there is a strong correlation between the FMO 
type and species types, including both variables will cause serious multicollinearity problems. To 
see if this problem existed in our sample, we counted the number of FMOs by targeted species 
and by FMO type (Table 7). There were 66 species targeted in our sample and, for most of them, 
three or fewer FMOs were involved. We separated “popular” targeted species, which we defined 
as species for which seven or more FMOs considered them to be main targets. Also, since 
abalone and turban shell were often harvested as a pair of targeted species, they were treated 
together as one entry. Other species that were targeted by only a few FMOs were categorized by 
their mobility characteristics—migratory fish, local (nonmigratory) fish, and sedentary species. 
The results show no systematic correlation between variables for FMO type and for species type 
and hence we included the species-type variables in the model. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
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  Revenue level can potentially be influenced by the markets to which harvested fish are 
allocated. Fish designated to fresh markets generally fetch higher prices than those going to 
frozen or processed markets. Freshness is particularly important for Japanese consumers as there 
is substantial demand for consumption of raw fish. Whether that translates into higher revenue, 
however, is a different issue. In reality, FMOs often implement rigorous quality control measures 
when they allocate their harvests to raw and fresh consumption. This is in line with the claim that 
the benefit of rationalized fishery management from output markets in terms of increased price is 
substantial and critical in sustaining the regime (Herrmann 1996; Homans and Wilen 2005). 
  Upon further examination, however, it became apparent that species-type and 
product-type variables caused multicollinearity problems when both were included in a regression. 
It turned out that, of the two variables, species type had more explanatory power.
7  This led us to 
drop the product-type variables from our estimation model. 
  Harvest method can also influence revenues, particularly if there are multiple gear types 
that can be used for a single species. For example, revenue from a clam fishery clearly will be 
different when one FMO harvests by diving and the other by dredging. However, in our sample 
the issue of multiple gear types in a single species is limited; with the exception of turban shell, 
all of the species in our study are harvested using a single type of gear (Table 8). As for turban 
shell, since it is often coexists with the abalone fishery, diving can be considered the dominant 
harvesting method for the two species. We concluded that including both species-type and 
gear-type variables would likely cause a multicollinearity problem and thus gear-type variables 
were excluded from the regression models. 
 
                                                 
7 This was done by comparing the results from the regressions 
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substituted by species-type and product-type variables. 30 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
  Other variables can potentially be included in the model. One is the average tonnage of 
the vessels owned by FMO members. The intuition is that larger vessels can have more crew 
members onboard and/or can be equipped with more powerful gear, all leading to a higher RPUE. 
  A few more variables were considered, primarily in response to the issue of potential 
endogeneity. Specifically, the main concern involved omitted variables that affect not only the 
level of per-member revenue but also the likelihood of a group choosing a particular type of 
FMO.
8 One such variable is the size of the FMO’s membership. As Ostrom et al. (2002) and 
others have pointed out, smaller groups have a better chance of implementing collective action 
and perhaps of developing more sophisticated forms of collective action than larger groups, 
ceteris paribus. This suggests that group size affects the choice of type of FMO; for example, 
smaller groups tend toward choosing Type A. 
  In addition to membership size, we considered the FMOs’ established year index variable. 
This variable ranged from 1 to 11, each corresponding to an interval of five years where 1 is the 
oldest (established on or prior to 1935) and 11 is the most recent (established on or after 2001).
9 
This variable is intended to capture any learning effects that might exist. Also, it is often the case 
that FMOs modify, and in many cases fine-tune, their management schemes and rules over time. 
                                                 
8 There is no selection bias issue here; there are observations on revenue for all four types of FMOs and which 
revenue data belongs to which FMO type is exactly known. Since the sample is confined to FMOs, one cannot 
address the question of what factors determine establishment of FMOs. 
9 The survey was constructed such that respondents were asked to check the interval into which establishment of 
their FMO fell. This particular format was employed based on experience from past surveys and results from pretests 
with local FMO managers, all of which indicated that FMO managers typically did not know the exact year the FMO 
had been established (particularly if it was in the distant past) but comfortably knew around when it was established. 
This format choice was one of the strategies we employed to enhance the response rate by easing the burden on the 
respondents. 31 
One expects that such modifications take place in efforts to increase the return from the fishery 
since making such changes incurs costs. 
  Lastly, we added regional dummy variables to account for any prefecture-specific fixed 
effects. There is a trend in market prices for certain species of fish that have been landed in 
particular parts of the country to be priced higher than the same species of fish landed elsewhere. 
For example, fish caught in northern waters are often regarded as being of better quality and so 
can fetch a premium price. In other cases, FMOs successfully differentiate their products (i.e., 
branding) and receive higher market prices. The regional dummy variable is intended to control 
for such influences on revenues. 
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where  i type  is a vector of FMO-type dummy variables;  i species  is a vector of the main 
targeted species-type dummy variables;  i TON   is the average tonnage of vessels owned per FMO 
member;  i MEMSIZE  is the size of the membership of an FMO;  i YEAR  is the number of years 
since establishment of the FMO;  i REGION   is the regional dummy variable; and  i ε   is the error 
term. 
Regression results 
One issue associated with mail surveys is that the researcher does not have full control on how 
respondents will answer the questions. Every effort was made to make important aspects of our 
questions explicit and comprehensible, both with wording and with layout of the survey, but one 
still must pay attention to possible measurement errors in the data. As such, much time was 32 
devoted to cleaning and checking the data for apparent inconsistencies. Little more can be done 
without resorting to ad hoc methods. However, we wanted to avoid the situation where small 
numbers of erroneous but undetected outliers dominate the model estimates and predictions. For 
this reason, we conducted a set of regression diagnostics based on Belsley et al. (1980) to detect 
influential observations and outliers. No outlier was detected in our estimation sample. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
  The coefficient estimate of the Type A FMO variable is 0.886 and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This estimate implies that members of Type A FMOs earn 
approximately 88.6% more[[[more than what, lacks a closing comparison]]] revenue per unit of 
effort. This is within the plausible range based on the results from the descriptive statistics in 
Table 6. The model estimates that Type A FMO members earn significantly higher RPUE than 
Type B FMO members. Such was not the case, however, between Type A and Type C. In 
addition, estimated coefficients of Type B and Type C were not significantly different from each 
other. 
  These results suggest the following regarding the relationships among effort coordination, 
pooling arrangements, and RPUE: (1) neither effort coordination nor pooling arrangements alone 
has a significant impact on the level of RPUE; (2) there is no superiority of effort coordination 
over pooling arrangements or vice versa; and (3) combining effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements has the most impact on RPUE. 
  We hypothesized that FMOs with either effort coordination or pooling arrangements 
perform better than those without either of the two schemes. This is partly supported by the fact 
that estimated coefficients for Type B and Type C were positive, but it is not fully supported 33 
since both were statistically insignificant. The second hypothesis—that FMOs with both perform 
better than those with only one—was almost fully supported, as the coefficient only for Type A 
was estimated to be significantly different from Type D. We say “almost” because the difference 
between Type A and Type B was significant but the difference between Type A and Type C was 
not. 
  Next we analyze whether the combination of effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements is solely responsible for higher RPUE. Many other types of self-imposed 
regulations and measures can be employed by FMOs (see Table 10). We divide the self-imposed 
rules into four categories. The first, marketing measures, includes quality control measures 
(proper icing, careful handling, etc.), development of new value-added products, and branding. 
Another is harvest control, which can involve setting a total-catch limit and/or an individual quota, 
controlling the daily landing volume to avoid market gluts, and restricting the size and/or age of 
the fish caught. Operational regulations cover restrictions on fishing hours and days, closures 
during the season, setting of no-fishing zones, and restrictions on fishing methods, fishing gear, 
and/or the number of crew members on a vessel. Finally, vessel regulations restrict the number of 
vessels, their tonnage, and their engine power. Some of these regulations are also imposed by the 
local or central government but in the survey we explicitly asked for self-imposed regulations, 
including those that are more stringent than existing government regulations. The primary reason 
for constructing our survey in such a way is that virtually all coastal fisheries in Japan have some 
sort of government regulations and they typically include operational restrictions and vessel 
regulations. Therefore, there would not have been much variation had the survey simply asked 
whether the fishery had regulations imposed. This led us to focus our attention on the existence of 
self-imposed and typically more stringent regulations that do vary across FMOs. 
 34 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
  We first estimated whether these four categories of self-imposed regulations have any 
impact of their own on revenue per unit of effort (Model 1 in Table 10). The results show that 
none has a statistically significant impact. The estimated positive sign for the marketing variable 
is intuitive since such activities are typically aimed at increasing revenue. The negative sign for 
the harvest control variable is plausible if the market price did not respond enough to supplement 
reduced landing volumes. 
  Note that the Type A FMO variable remained statistically significant even after the 
addition of self-imposed regulation covariates. Thus, the next question is whether combinations 
of Type A FMOs and self-imposed regulations have significant impacts on revenue per unit of 
effort. To answer that question, we added interaction terms for Type A and regulation variables to 
the estimation model (3).
10 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
  First we estimated the model with the four regulation categories—marketing, harvest 
control, operation regulation, and vessel regulation—interacting with the Type A dummy variable 
(model 2 in Table 10). Each category has multiple subcategories, so these dummy variables were 
constructed such that if one or more of the subcategories was employed then the dummy variable 
would equal 1; otherwise it would equal 0. The results show that marketing employed by Type A 
FMOs has a positive and almost statistically significant ( p -value = 0.101) impact on the RPUE. 
                                                 
10 Interaction terms for Type B and Type C variables were also estimated but neither had statistically significant 
impacts. 35 
This suggests that marketing practices can be effective in increasing revenue if they are 
conducted through effort coordination supported by a pooling arrangement, which is consistent 
with our intuition and in line with the result we found from census analysis. 
  Next we focused on both marketing and harvest-control regulations by dividing them into 
their subcategories to investigate which subcategories are most influential. Marketing variables 
include quality control, new product development, and branding. Harvest-control variables 
include total catch limits (TACs), individual catch limits (IQs), supply/landing volume controls, 
and size/age restrictions. Each subcategory was interacted with the Type A FMO dummy variable 
(Model 3 in Table 10). 
  Several results are interesting. First, none of the marketing subcategories was significant. 
A plausible explanation is that the success of marketing depends heavily on the product type and 
on market conditions on a case-by-case basis so no single marketing activity can be a silver bullet. 
The result from the aggregated marketing variable in model 2, in return, implies that Type A 
FMOs select the most effective form of marketing activity based on market conditions. 
  Secondly, the results from the harvest-control subcategory variables show that individual 
catch limits (IQs) have a positive effect and that size and age control have a negative impact on 
RPUE and that both are statistically significant. Size and age restrictions either reduce harvest 
volumes or prolong fishing time as operators try to compensate for the volume loss.
11 Thus, 
RPUE typically decreases in such cases. 
  Interestingly, all FMOs with IQs in the sample also had size and age controls (but not vice 
versa). The fact that the IQ subcategory was estimated to have a positive and significant impact 
                                                 
11  Harvested volume could increase since now each fish that is harvested is larger (due to minimum size restrictions) 
even though the harvested number decreased. Although this is possible in principle, it is an unlikely case because the 
current condition is often such that stock depletion is accompanied by shrinking in the size of harvested fish; that is, 
the fish that are large enough to compensate for the loss of volume are long gone. 36 
on RPUE suggests the strength of IQs. Two possible scenarios come to mind. One is that, with 
only size and age restrictions, fishermen are driven by the incentive to race and hence spend too 
much time fishing, ultimately to the extent that the RPUE declines. Such excessive fishing is 
mitigated by capping harvest volumes and allocating the share of that total harvest to fishermen 
via IQs, thus enhancing RPUE. However, recall that we are examining the impact of these 
self-imposed regulations within the context of Type A FMOs that have both effort coordination 
and pooling arrangements. The incentive to race to fish is likely to be less intense in this case so 
this scenario is unlikely. Another potential scenario is that IQs function as a “benchmark” by 
which to detect shirking members. Because of the presence of the pooling arrangement, FMO 
members are, in principle, prone to shirking. If a member returns from a fishing trip with a 
below-quota harvest volume that is beyond reasonable daily fluctuations, such incidents can be 
used as an indicator of shirking. IQs can be used to replace physical peer monitoring among 
members, which can be useful in fisheries in which vessels operate in a dispersed manner. 
  On a final note, the significance level for the Type A FMO’s dummy variable decreased 
with the introduction of interaction terms of Type A and self-imposed regulation variables. This 
result suggests that, in practice, effort coordination and pooling arrangements alone are not 
enough—members must engage in revenue-enhancing activities. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the economic performance of fishery comanagement regimes as measured by 
fishery revenue by using the case of FMOs in Japanese coastal fisheries. Our focus is on the rules 
of the game that alter the incentive structure for individual fisherman and the outcomes that have 
resulted. Upon examination of rules and management measures adopted by successful FMOs, we 37 
selected three features: effort coordination, pooling arrangements, and marketing activities. 
Conceptually, each feature has the potential to bring higher revenue, even more so when 
implemented together. However, high transaction costs involved in implementing these measures 
and making them work give rise to an empirical question about whether their potential benefits 
have been realized in practice. The objective of this paper is to answer that question using 
publicly available fishery census data and survey data collected by the authors. 
  First, using data from the fishery census, we tested whether fishermen associated with 
FMOs that have pooling arrangements earn greater revenue than fishermen in FMOs that lack 
such arrangements and non-FMO fishermen. Our analysis showed that FMOs that have pooling 
arrangements earn significantly higher revenue. The question remains whether it is the pooling 
arrangements per se or the effort coordination or both that generates these results since pooling 
arrangements are often implemented to support sophisticated methods of effort coordination to 
fetch higher prices and hence greater revenues. 
  The statistical insignificance of the marketing activity variables on fishery revenue is 
somewhat surprising, particularly since markets tend to respond quickly. One explanation for 
such a result is that engaging in marketing is different from using marketing effectively. Perhaps 
marketing activities must be coordinated and pursued in a collective manner for them to be 
effective. Since pooling arrangements create an incentive for such collective action, we examined 
whether FMOs that have pooling arrangements and engaged in marketing activities had an impact 
on fishery revenue. The results were not statistically significant, but the direction of the changes 
in the results suggests that our hypothesis is a plausible one. 
  Following our analysis of the census, we focused our attention on the combination of 
pooling arrangements and effort coordination using data from our survey. We estimate that a 
member of a Type A FMO (which employs both effort coordination and a pooling arrangement) 38 
earns approximately 88.6% more revenue per unit of effort than a member of a Type D FMO 
(neither regime is used). Members of Type A FMOs earn significantly higher revenue per unit of 
effort (RPUE) than do Type B FMO (effort coordination only) members. Although this might 
seem to suggest that pooling arrangements have a larger influence on revenue than effort 
coordination, Type B and Type C (pooling arrangements only) were not significantly different 
from each other, and neither was significantly different from Type D. Thus, our hypothesis that 
FMOs with either effort coordination or pooling arrangements perform better than those without 
the two measures was not fully supported, although the estimated coefficients had the expected 
positive signs. Our second hypothesis that FMOs with both measures in place perform better than 
those with only one was almost fully supported. The results regarding marketing activities were 
similar to those for the census results: the marketing variable by itself showed no significance, 
but when conditioned on Type A FMOs, its significance level was enhanced. This suggests that 
marketing activities per se cannot automatically bring in higher revenue. To be effective, they 
must be delivered in a collective manner and adoption of effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements enhances the chance of successful collective action. 
  There are some caveats to our analysis. Most importantly, neither the census data nor our 
survey data provide information on costs related to fishing operation, so any effects of pooling 
arrangements and effort coordination on cost savings are not captured. As discussed earlier, 
pooling arrangements may reduce the race to fish by introducing an incentive to “shirk.” But if 
this simply reduces input costs, it would not reveal its impact in the current regression. On the 
other hand, pooling arrangements and effort coordination may actually be adopted to help sustain 
intertemporal effort-smoothing in order to maximize revenue, in which case it would show a 
statistical effect. Another important factor not considered in our analysis is the effect of 
comanagement on resource stock levels and its feedback impacts on harvest costs. 39 
  There are, nonetheless, several policy implications for successful fishery comanagement 
that can be drawn from our results. Establishment of demarcated areas covered by fishing rights 
and governed by collective bodies of fishermen, whether they are FCAs or FMOs, is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for success. Among things in which an FCA/FMO can get involved, 
marketing activities have a good chance of generating higher returns from fishery comanagement 
if the marketing efforts are effective. The effectiveness of marketing depends on whether it is 
done in a collective manner, and for this reason, implementing pooling arrangements, effort 
coordination, or any other policy to enhance the chance of collective action should be considered. 
The fact that marketing has positive impacts on revenue suggests that benefits arising from output 
markets can be substantial and important in fishery comanagement. Policies aimed at developing 
market infrastructure, such as wholesale fish markets and means of transporting the fish (i.e., 
linking the markets), may benefit fishery comanagement. 
  This paper shows that fishery comanagement that employs effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements can bring higher revenue to participating fishermen, but there is one catch that must 
be addressed in relation to policy implications. For example, note that in our survey data analysis 
the dependent variable in the estimation models was RPUE. This means that even if the RPUE is 
high, one’s total (or annual) revenue level can still be low, or not enough to support the family 
through an entire year. Effort coordination, such as rotating fishing grounds and days in particular, 
can mean that one’s turn to fish comes only a few times a month. Pooling arrangements 
discourage fishing in uncomfortable conditions such as bad weather. All of these factors result in 
fewer fishing days to such an extent that annual earnings are too low. 
  The possibility of fisheries being lucrative per unit of effort but unable to bring in enough 
total revenue to support the annual livelihoods of fishermen requires the existence of income 
from outside the managed fisheries for successful and sustainable fishery comanagement. This 40 
point was raised by many FMO managers and local research authors who we interviewed. Such 
outside income sources include fisheries other than managed ones and nonfishing jobs such as 
farming and construction work. Interestingly, this is in direct contradiction with the notion that 
outside options undermine the sustainability of comanagement regimes (e.g., Ostrom et al. 2002, 
p. 450). 
  The trade-off between lucrative fishery and a supporting yearly livelihood is not, of 
course, necessarily always the case. Like the case of the Pacific halibut fishery (Casey et al. 1995), 
a fishery management policy that reduces the race to fish and redirects more effort to quality 
control can achieve both a more lucrative fishery and a prolonged fishing season. In such a case, 
the availability of outside income sources might be of no significance. The take-home message of 
this paper is, therefore, that effort coordination and pooling arrangements may not be the most 
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